Look here:
Discover how Macs with Apple silicon will deliver modern advantages using Apple's System-on-Chip (SoC) architecture. Leveraging a unified...
developer.apple.com
starting at 19:10 (or 18:50 for reduced security mode).
It's obvious that when they describe how you can use csrutil to configure Secure Boot, they do not just refer to the possibility to enable "Reduced Security". They explicitly say that you would want to use csrutil if you develop kernel extensions. In "Reduced Security" mode (which they describe earlier), only notarized kernel extensions would run, so those cannot be the same modes.
None of thoe csrutil options turn off the requirement for an Apple signed OS . Apple has also told folks in this and other session to get off of legacy kernel extensions because it is going away. it is there no because some stuff is more slowly going to move over and probably needs more time , but it is on its way out.
Turning SIP on/off , adding a kernel extension ( temporary signed or notarized for deployment) , etc. none that changes the signature status of the core kernel code that Apple wrote and signed. Apple isn't completely locking every and all possible edge cases down. But they are super serious about protecting the initial boot process because there is lots of privacy/security infrastructure layered on top of that.
And if for some reason csrutil would allow you to run your own kernel extensions, but would prevent you from booting other operating systems, it would be trivial to write a kernel extension that boots another OS. (Therefore there's absolutely no reason for Apple to allow the development of kernel extensions while preventing the launch of other operating systems in the first place.)
I guess you misses the part of the video at 6:44 of the video talks about security. Kernel Integrity Protection makes the kernel immutable. ( self modifying code is horrible bad security kernel code. There is approximately zero good reason for self modifying code to be in the kernel . None. ) Write X^R makes it kind of hard to eat the scheduler when it still may be running and not get a horrible system crash. In short, Apple has added very substantive hardware to make that harder; not trivial. And real bootloaders (or type 1 hypervisors ) don't need that kind self modifying code. So these hardware additions don't block them , just a large class of kernel subversion security holes.
Why? Because that is
not what kernel extension are suppose to do at all. Kernel extensions the "eat" other parts of the kernel are grossly untrustworthy.
The kind of gross perversion is why they will get retired over time. Easy attacks on the security code of the operating systems is exactly what Apple doesn't want to allow. Folks "extending" the system or understanding how it works better is what they want to continue to enable.
Sicking a "man in the middle" of the OS to pilfer through people's private data ... no. That isn't in their long term plan of enabling.
Also, when John Gruber asked Craig Federighi where the rumors are coming from that Apple would use the ARM transition to further lock-in developers or users, Federighi says:
... to find ways to advance security in an environment that we believe like the Mac should be open to hobbyist experimentation. The fact that we have these different modes to explicitly turn off System Integrity Protection, right, why did we do that? We didn't have to! We did it because we want Mac users who want to do hobbyist things to have that kind of power, I mean we continue to demonstrate over and over how we feel about this. Speculation to the contrary, I just think, is not founded in the evidence and I think we'll put another very clear data point up on the board when people look in greater detail at these systems. ...
he outlines kernel extensions , but no where in there does he suggest "hobbyist" undoing , modify, circumventing Apple security on the Mac done at the secure enclosure level. Apple isn't giving folks direct access to the firmware because that is a root of trust security trust vector that is foundational to their own code. Hobbyist code that wants to get along with Apple Code? OK. Hobbyist code that think Apple code should be casually tossed aside? There is nothing above that lines up with that. Kernel extensions are suppose to
"extend" the kernel; not subvert it to a boarder set of security hole vectors.
The key quote there is that Apple is interest in
advancing security. Not going backwards. Where that runs into conflicts with hobbyists then the tie breaker is probably going to go to "advancing security" .
Apple doing per device IOMMU mapping so that does not have willy nilly access to the kernel is exactly one of those advancing security moves. It allows better extensions. And fewer rogue disruptors. The primary instance of the firmware being controlled by the 'boot/security separate subsystem" and only a copy of boot firmware presented to the host CPU. Again trusted extensions not blocked. Rouge disruptors blocked.
That would be really dishonest if he knew exactly that Apple would use the switch to ARM to lock down the bootloader.
There is nothing dishonest in his statement because the collective statement doesn't put security on the far burner for Apple. It is there on the front. It helps to not cherry pick out the parts you want to see and ignore the rest that are highly relevant.
Apple had a security disconnect problem with external drives the T2. So they had a cranked down mode where wasn't secure and more open to external. This iteration they folded external drives (with signed OS) into the Full Security mode. That is an example of "advancing security" and a broader range of user objectives at the same time. That is illustrative of what he is talking there in that quote.
The bootloader is only locked in in that have to be signed to boot. Other trustworthy folks stuff could get signed.
He also comments in the video about how having a modern virtual machine means that folks can run a wide variety of other OS on top of the secured boot process that Apple provides. There is a bit of a door there for perhaps some other type 1 hypervisors getting signed. Or some other OS that goes through Apple's trust process far enough to get a signature.