Good luck verifying you have SECURELY erased an SSD
You should look at this work being done at UCSD, in particular the USENIX paper.
http://nvsl.ucsd.edu/sanitize/
As a consumer, we don't have a way to verify a vendor's implementation of the ATA sanitizing commands, though most just say they wipe the FTL. If that is the case, then their sanitizing software will not really erase anything (but it will restore performance).
Even the drives that uses encryption may not really be sanitized, because there is no way for most consumers to verify that the way they wipe the key is sufficient.
Single file scrubbing (like Secure Empty Trash or srm on the Mac) leave 67% of the data behind. On almost any OS or any tool, file and free space wiping are almost certainly not going to work well.
If the vendor doesn't implement the ATA sanitizing commands well, then you can do a full disk format twice, and that does wipe most drives clean that use MLCs. SLCs could potentially leave some analog traces behind, but I don't know that there is any tech right now that would help you get at those. Full drive wipes preferably would write random data, as some SSDs use compression. In that case a writing a bunch of 0s doesn't do much. In either case, resetting to all ones with the ATA sanitizing commands afterwards would be good for performance restoration after formatting.
I would REALLY like to see a formal statement form vendors that they have worked with the people at UCSD to understand if they have implemented the sanitizing commands correctly, and I would love to see a tool that could sanitize your drives in a Mac using those low-level commands.
So to answer your question, if you want to be sure, you'll have to physically destroy your drive. Next time, you may want to do whole disk encryption or something like FileVault so that the OS only writes encrypted data to disk. Then you don't have to worry about sanitizing as long as you aren't writing the key in plaintext to the drive ever.
You should look at this work being done at UCSD, in particular the USENIX paper.
http://nvsl.ucsd.edu/sanitize/
As a consumer, we don't have a way to verify a vendor's implementation of the ATA sanitizing commands, though most just say they wipe the FTL. If that is the case, then their sanitizing software will not really erase anything (but it will restore performance).
Even the drives that uses encryption may not really be sanitized, because there is no way for most consumers to verify that the way they wipe the key is sufficient.
Single file scrubbing (like Secure Empty Trash or srm on the Mac) leave 67% of the data behind. On almost any OS or any tool, file and free space wiping are almost certainly not going to work well.
If the vendor doesn't implement the ATA sanitizing commands well, then you can do a full disk format twice, and that does wipe most drives clean that use MLCs. SLCs could potentially leave some analog traces behind, but I don't know that there is any tech right now that would help you get at those. Full drive wipes preferably would write random data, as some SSDs use compression. In that case a writing a bunch of 0s doesn't do much. In either case, resetting to all ones with the ATA sanitizing commands afterwards would be good for performance restoration after formatting.
I would REALLY like to see a formal statement form vendors that they have worked with the people at UCSD to understand if they have implemented the sanitizing commands correctly, and I would love to see a tool that could sanitize your drives in a Mac using those low-level commands.
So to answer your question, if you want to be sure, you'll have to physically destroy your drive. Next time, you may want to do whole disk encryption or something like FileVault so that the OS only writes encrypted data to disk. Then you don't have to worry about sanitizing as long as you aren't writing the key in plaintext to the drive ever.