You're in violent agreement with the whole purpose of this thread - welcome to the discussion. The majority of vulnerabilities exposed by projects like OCLP are those due to unintended design flaws and coding mistakes. And to inject root patches, we know that OCLP defeats macOS security features by partially disabling SIP, disabling Secure Boot Model and breaking the APFS seal, so an OCLP-patched Mac is inherently less secure than a fully supported Mac (one of the primary OCLP Developers admitted to this reduced security in this very thread).All it takes is one bad actor to contribute code to OCLP that is accepted by the project.
In my opinion, the most alarming aspect of OCLP is the way that it was introduced as "Experience macOS just like before," "Built with Security in Mind" and "You're just as secure as a supported Mac" (the latter messages which have thankfully been abandoned by the OCLP Developers).
Like you, I have entertained the "bad actor" scenarios and for good reason - there are plenty of real-world examples. In this thread, I have chosen to give the OCLP Developers the benefit of the doubt and have made the requests documented here. OCLP Documentation and Messaging is still woefully deficient in warning about the downgraded security of an OCLP-patched Mac. I remain disappointed that the OCLP Developers have still not included crystal clear warnings in the OCLP GUI and Documentation.
EDIT: It is clear to me that the OCLP Developers know about the downgraded macOS security of an OCLP-patched Mac and that they consciously choose not to provide the requested security warnings. Willful negligence is intent.
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