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Stolen iPhone - Criminals have full control and Apple cannot help!
- Thread starter danclara
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Apple should make you enter the old passcode/password when updating to a new passcode/password.
I feel the alpha numeric password would prevent a lot of this, but if the thief somehow is able to look 👀 over your shoulder and see your exact password defeats the purpose of just having a password. Apple needs to implement a 4-form authentication: FaceID, Password, Airtag and close contact, to authenticate and get back in your account. This way a thief has no chance to take over your phone 📱 and iCloud account
Yes, but in your example the thief has the old password. You probably we’re saying that Apple should have everyone setup a Master passcode and a regular passcode. The thief would have to have the master passcode and the regular passcode in order to change anything. I agree that Apple should implement this
You would only put in the Master passcode when doing significant changes, thus making it harder if not impossible for the thief to figure without doing some type of brute force method
It still makes sense to require Apple ID password to lock out the user. Not a simple 6-digit PIN.
I was poking around on my iPad and it is true, there is no defense against the passcode. That is all you need.
And on top of that Apple insists at semi-random times that I enter the passcode instead of using Touch ID.
My decision to stick with a flip-phone is vindicated.
My decision to not use iCloud is vindicated.
Also my decision to restrict any and all financial transactions solely to the Linux box is vindicated.
The main weakness remaining is that the passcode lets the bad guy change the Apple account ID and that account is linked to a credit card. So is that well enough defended? Or should Apple drop the requirement that that a credit card is needed to have an Apple account? Or should I get a burner credit card with a $20 limit to limit potential losses? Could I use a gift card instead of a credit card?
This is especially topical as I lost a debit card somewhere in Montana last week. I didn't notice for a couple of days, fortunately nothing had happened to the account. Either someone honest found it and tossed it or they didn't figure out the PIN.
This has always been a fundamental design flaw in Apple's security model. Rather than having the device PIN code be the primary authenticator, it should be the AppleID password.
Hopefully this will be a primary focus for WWDC.
I also would really like to see an in-person service at apple stores that let's you at least lock down the account by presenting ID and other proof of identity. I get social engineering and not wanting to grant access from hundreds of locations, but you should be at least able to set a 'compromised' flag in person, then work through a central support place to regain full control.
Except in this case the bad guys already have it.
They should require the Apple ID password to reset the device passcode. (and not allow the reverse).
What Apple has done here is to make the least secure, most entered (in public!), authenticator the primary one. That's a design flaw. It should be the most secure/complex one that's required to reset the easier ones.
When you are 120 miles from the nearest Apple store that is not an optimal solution, but it's better than what we have.
I think it’s fine to have the information on there. The thing is, one must then treat it like a device that has their bank access and other critical information on it.
If you have two Apple devices then it wouldn't be hard to require a verification code sent to the other to change anything on either.
But if you only have one, then it gets sticky. My iPad is wi-fi only, so if you sent a code to either the laptop or the flip phone before allowing any changes to the account settings that would work.
But if you sent a verification code to the phone number of an iPhone you have done no good. You can't email it for the same reason. The master password idea works until you forget it, then you have to reset the password which only requires the passcode the bad guy already has. So you would need a really good password written down and filed in a secure location, probably right next to your birth certificate.
But if you only have one, then it gets sticky. My iPad is wi-fi only, so if you sent a code to either the laptop or the flip phone before allowing any changes to the account settings that would work.
But if you sent a verification code to the phone number of an iPhone you have done no good. You can't email it for the same reason. The master password idea works until you forget it, then you have to reset the password which only requires the passcode the bad guy already has. So you would need a really good password written down and filed in a secure location, probably right next to your birth certificate.
So many good posts in here. Despite my troubles I am pleased to see others highlighting a flaw in Apple security.
They should disable the flaw ASAP.
iCloud account changes should only be available via browser or via two step or biometric authentication.
If someone forgets their password, the reset process should also rely on this, or have a 24 hour time delay, to give people a chance to react to a stolen or lost device.
They should disable the flaw ASAP.
iCloud account changes should only be available via browser or via two step or biometric authentication.
If someone forgets their password, the reset process should also rely on this, or have a 24 hour time delay, to give people a chance to react to a stolen or lost device.
this thread has made my appreciate my apple watch a bit more. they can't spy on your passcode because you never have to enter it (apart from when you get out of bed and put it on). they can't swipe it out of your pocket. you can't leave it behind anywhere and forget to pick it up. and you can pay for stuff without getting anything out of your pocket.
Apple needs to implement a device master passcode and a regular passcode and also 3 security questions in order to change the Apple ID passcode/password
Sorry this happened. I don't understand why Apple doesn't at least provide users with an option to lock it down, even if there is an added inconvenience.
My wife and I got new iPhones in February. I decided to activate iCloud advanced data protection. I could do it on my phone but advanced data protection on my wife's phone can't be activated until sometime in June. It really feels like Apple has things backwards sometimes.
Yes I just tried mine as I couldn’t remember but it doesn’t allow me to log in with my phones passcode.
Isn’t it the same issue with ANY security, though? If one provides to a malicious actor (intentionally or unintentionally) the means to authenticate to their device, that user has effectively rendered a large number security protections ineffective. The most insecure vector of any device is the user with access or admin permissions to that devices.
The best thing about stories like this is that it helps people to understand some of what makes them a target. While folks have gotten away with it for years, they will now understand that they shouldn’t enter their phone’s PIN in public without taking steps to ensure they’re not seen.
Correct. And people have their entire bank account secured by a 4 digit numeric key. And some organizations have their building secured by a 4 digit key. The difference is that folks entering their key at an ATM or to enter their offices actually take some effort to ensure their code is not being seen… because they know what entering the key in the view of others might mean.
The fact that the same people don’t take the same precautions when entering a 4 or 6 digit key into their phone is the problem that I’m hoping stories like this are educating people about.
The problem is that most smart phone users want the convenience of being able to access their accounts if they forget their credentials. The only reason it is easy to reset the Apple ID with the passcode is because Apple has built it all into the same ecosystem. It isn't as easy to reset passwords outside of the ecosystem, but there is no reason - other than convenience - to make it easy within the ecosystem.
Even if Apple offered an option to make changing the Apple ID password more difficult, a cohort of users would decide that it wasn't worth the inconvenience and refuse to use it. But at least they would have the option.
A simple way for Apple to fix this is to require 2FA to change the Apple ID password, either with a OTP through another registered device (not email) or an authenticator app on the phone that unlocks with biometrics.