The attacker would need the valid password and a valid one-time code to log in. Simply brute forcing one code is not enough. See: http://www.google.com/support/accounts/bin/answer.py?answer=1187538
In relation to Google's implementation of 2-step authentication, this is absolutely untrue.
You only need an application specific password to log in with many clients.
The application specific passwords provided by Google are weaker than a secure password generated by the user.
First of all, the application specific password is quite long, but only consists of lowercase letters - and always has the same length - making them generally easier to guess in a brute-force attack than a user-password.
http://www.ilikealot.com/i/experience_from_using_2-step_verification_with_my_google_account
Also, despite Google making it appear that these application specific passwords can't be re-used, these passwords can be used across many client applications.
Then, these passwords aren't that specific to one application as one might wish for.
http://www.ilikealot.com/i/experience_from_using_2-step_verification_with_my_google_account
So, using Google's 2-step authentication is less secure than using a single secure password if the user accesses the Google account via non-browser client software.
Here is another link to information about this security vulnerability: http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/Google+Mobile/thread?tid=469b8ac44c5fd3d7&hl=en
You keep slamming a system that clearly you have never used or under stand. You are spreading FUD.
I'm not slamming 2-step authentication as a whole.
I'm pointing out issues with Google's implementation of 2-step authentication.
Well first off the 1 time use verification codes are longer than 6 digits (they are 8)
The one-time codes are typically only 6 digits. The backup codes are 8 digits.
The one-time codes are not relevant given that an attacker can brute force the backup codes.
It only takes a few minutes to brute force a code made up of 8 numbers. This time is shortened due to 10 backup codes being available to compromise.
Also, see my reply to "neiltc13" above for information about another major weakness in Google's 2-step authentication.
Also I point back to it is 2 step. It requires you knowing someones password which should be secure any how.
That is exactly my point. A secure password is still the most important security mitigation.
And, the codes and application specific passwords provided by Google don't meet the minimum standard of being a secure password.
Also brute forcing the 2 step is rather hard in time because google does slow it down after a few fail attempts. Brute force kind of sucks when you can not do slam it 100's a second.
Link to source stating that Google limit attempts when brute forcing both the backup codes and application specific passwords?
More FUD. At this point this is pure FUD.
Explicitly explain how the quote below is FUD.
Sure, if you know someone is accessing the device.
But someone trying to compromise your account locally does not necessarily involve your device being stolen; someone can access your device without stealing it.
And, allowing the extra authentication to be suspended negates the purpose of it in the first place.
So, that machine is functioning like it only has a single password. Which means that this is no more secure than having only a single password. Which means that it is still important to make sure to use a secure password.
You clearly have done zero research in to it and on top of that you clearly have zero understanding of how it works.
Are you sure?
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