The Aircraft Thread!

[cube]

I agree that cattle class is aweful on an international flight. For myself when we can get into business class for free, that is sweet by virtue of being a former employee. Otherwise business is too expensive, and instead we opt for something to the equivalent of economy comfort class, which you probably know, is separate from economy, but has better seat pitch and legroom.

That would be Economy Comfort or US Y+.

Proper Premium Economy would be much better.

 

[VivaLasVegas]

Customers absolutely don't like the decreased pitch, narrower less comfortable seats, and extra seats in the aisle. It is bearable for a short flight - of up to around two hours - but horrible for anything longer.

Actually, it is horrible - full stop, but you can grit your teeth for an hour; the decreased pitch means there is little room even in the seat pocket of the seat in front of you, and the arm rests are miserable as well.

You're right passengers don't like decreased pitch, narrower less comfortable seats, and extra seats in the aisle. But they like the lower ticket costs which drive these changes. Sadly cost will always win out.

As Scepticalscribe said, the difference can be felt.

I have thousands of hours as a pilot in both the Boeing 737 and A320 family. It is negligible. As for the rest it is airline dependent on what the airline orders in terms of seats, seat width, seat pitch & overhead bin.

Boeing designed the tiny lavs to fit more seats on the 737 MAX. If Airbus also offered this, many people would be complaining too.

AA is the only airline with what you call the tiny lavs so it's obvious it isn't a Boeing factor but an airline factor. Boeing was just offering what the customer, AA, wanted which was more space for seats. I fly with a WN pilot in my reserve unit who told me WN has the same lav on the 737 MAX that they have on the 737NG.

FBW was not the main reason for the miracle on the Hudson, but it may have been one of the critical success factors.

You didn't read what I wrote if you still think FWB contributed to the success of Miracle on the Hudson. It didn't allow Sullenberger to flare which would have decreased the rate of decent.

Garuda 421 broke because of the landing angle. One person died.

Still a successful ditching in a non FWB aircraft.

IMHO, the main reason AF447 was turned into a disaster was inadequacy for piloting.

It's hardly "inadequacy for piloting"

• The captain, 58-year-old Marc Dubois (PNF-Pilot Not Flying) had joined Air France (at the time, Air Inter) in February 1988 and had 10,988 flying hours, of which 6,258 were as captain, including 1,700 hours on the Airbus A330
• The first officer, co-pilot in left seat, 37-year-old David Robert (PNF-Pilot Not Flying) had joined Air France in July 1998 and had 6,547 flying hours, of which 4,479 hours were on the Airbus A330
• The first officer, co-pilot in right seat, 32-year-old Pierre-Cédric Bonin (PF-Pilot Flying) had joined Air France in October 2003 and had 2,936 flight hours, of which 807 hours were on the Airbus A330

That sounds like an experienced crew and if there was any inadequacy it would have been overcome in no less than 2,936 flight hours and 807 hours on the A330. I've flown both the F-16 and C-40 with pilots that had less than 807 hours and just came from training and none of them had any issues. The issue with AF447 was the pitot tube iced and showed incorrect information and both the PF & PM attempted to fix the issue but made it worse. If you think I'm wrong look at how the NWA crew handled Flight 8 which had the same pitot freezing issue.

• In response to the stall, first officer Robert took over control and pushed his control stick forward to lower the nose and recover from the stall; however, Bonin was still pulling his control stick back, lifting the nose further up. The inputs cancelled each other out.
• The pilot-in-control pulled back on the stick, thus increasing the angle of attack and causing the aircraft to climb rapidly.
• In April 2012 in The Daily Telegraph, British journalist Nick Ross published a comparison of Airbus and Boeing flight controls; unlike the control yoke used on Boeing flight decks, the Airbus side stick controls give little visual feedback and no sensory or tactile feedback to the second pilot. Ross reasoned that this might in part explain why the pilot flying's fatal nose-up inputs were not countermanded by his two colleagues

The sides stick on the airbus was a nice feature, fun to fly with it, and it was not an issue under most routine operations, but I acknowledge the issue, admit that it would be better if both sticks were synchronized and know of one incident where contrary input almost resulted in an accident.

Is AF447 the incident you're referring to? Having both side sticks synced would make it easier to see what was happening. I wish auto throttle moved the thrust levers on the A320 like the 737. I hear the A220 does move as well.

I think if force feedback was such a big issue, Airbus would have already offered a retrofit.

It is a big issue but I would doubt Airbus would have offered it given the different flight philosophies of Boeing and Airbus. I have thousands of hours in a 737 and A320 and the 737 is made to be flown and the A320 is made to be flown in auto pilot. I know Captains who engage autopilot at V1 and don't disengage it until minimums which is how the A320 was made to be flown.

I agree that cattle class is aweful on an international flight. For myself when we can get into business class for free, that is sweet by virtue of being a former employee. Otherwise business is too expensive, and instead we opt for something to the equivalent of economy comfort class, which you probably know, is separate from economy, but has better seat pitch and legroom.

I can't sit in regular economy because I am tall and my knees hit the back of the seat in front of me.

That would be Economy Comfort or US Y+.

Proper Premium Economy would be much better.

Focusing on customer satisfaction and not profit would be better.

 

[cube]

I have thousands of hours as a pilot in both the Boeing 737 and A320 family. It is negligible. As for the rest it is airline dependent on what the airline orders in terms of seats, seat width, seat pitch & overhead bin.

AA is the only airline with what you call the tiny lavs so it's obvious it isn't a Boeing factor but an airline factor. Boeing was just offering what the customer, AA, wanted which was more space for seats. I fly with a WN pilot in my reserve unit who told me WN has the same lav on the 737 MAX that they have on the 737NG.

You didn't read what I wrote if you still think FWB contributed to the success of Miracle on the Hudson.

Still a successful ditching in a non FWB aircraft.

It's hardly "inadequacy for piloting"
It is a big issue but I would doubt Airbus would have offered it given the different flight philosophies of Boeing and Airbus.

Experience as a pilot does not make you an expert in PaxEx.

People are not only complaining about the lavs in AA. The press is already complaining about Ryanair before EIS, for example. Southwest said they would not downsize the toilets.

The miracle on the Hudson is that nobody died, which was not the case for Garuda.

The A320 does not know the depth of the river. See Garuda.

The captain in AF447 was not in the cockpit. The junior officer responded to a stall warning by continuously pulling on the stick, what do you call that?

Force feedback joysticks have nothing to do with flight philosophies.

 

[VivaLasVegas]

Experience as a pilot does not make you an expert in PaxEx.

Do you work for Airbus?
You're right but as a pilot I also jump seat in the cabin of various aircraft. I have close to 600,000 miles logged as a passenger across various airlines and aircraft so I am an expert in PasEx given those credentials. What are your credentials in PasEx? How about the A321XLR putting a flight attendant seat on the lav door to add more passenger seats?
I will say the flight deck is more spacious on the A320 than the 737 but it is also a newer design by 20 years. It's also quieter than the 737 but some good ANR headsets lie my Bose A20 make them the same. Boeing kept the 737 the way it has overtime to keep the same type rating.

People are not only complaining about the lavs in AA. Also about Ryanair and it seems Southwest too, for example.

Ryanair doesn't have a 737 MAX yet which is proof that it is the airlines which dictate the layout of their cabin. Ryanair like easyJet is a low cost carrier and their objective is to get as many seats onboard to increase revenue. Southwest has the same configuration on the 737 MAX 8 they have on the 737-800 and according to a WN. The lav on WN's 737 MAX 8 is the same size as their 737-800. I checked to see if my guy was right.

The miracle on the Hudson is that nobody died, which was not the case for Garuda.

Having 1 fatality with 60 passengers on an aircraft disaster is pretty great. No deaths would be even better but that can hardly be attributed to the A320's FBW.

The captain in AF447 was not in the cabin. The junior officer responded to a stall warning by continuously pulling on the stick, what do you call that?

It shows the PF was only paying attention to the instruments but when the PM attempted to intervene it was too late because of FBW. This wouldn't have happened on a Boeing because the PM would have been no computer to override the inputs. I've done a similar maneuver in the 737 sim and was successful.

Force feedback joysticks have nothing to do with flight philosophies.

It does have to do with the difference in flight philosophies between Boeing and Airbus. Boeing is made to be flown and Airbus is made to be flown on autopilot. Active sidesticks have no use with an aircraft that is made to be flown on auto pilot. I fly with Captains who engage autopilot at V1 and don't disengage it until minimums which is how the A320 was made to be flown.

 

[Huntn]

You're right passengers don't like decreased pitch, narrower less comfortable seats, and extra seats in the aisle. But they like the lower ticket costs which drive these changes. Sadly cost will always win out.

I have thousands of hours as a pilot in both the Boeing 737 and A320 family. It is negligible. As for the rest it is airline dependent on what the airline orders in terms of seats, seat width, seat pitch & overhead bin.

AA is the only airline with what you call the tiny lavs so it's obvious it isn't a Boeing factor but an airline factor. Boeing was just offering what the customer, AA, wanted which was more space for seats. I fly with a WN pilot in my reserve unit who told me WN has the same lav on the 737 MAX that they have on the 737NG.

You didn't read what I wrote if you still think FWB contributed to the success of Miracle on the Hudson. It didn't allow Sullenberger to flare which would have decreased the rate of decent.

Still a successful ditching in a non FWB aircraft.

It's hardly "inadequacy for piloting"

• The captain, 58-year-old Marc Dubois (PNF-Pilot Not Flying) had joined Air France (at the time, Air Inter) in February 1988 and had 10,988 flying hours, of which 6,258 were as captain, including 1,700 hours on the Airbus A330
• The first officer, co-pilot in left seat, 37-year-old David Robert (PNF-Pilot Not Flying) had joined Air France in July 1998 and had 6,547 flying hours, of which 4,479 hours were on the Airbus A330
• The first officer, co-pilot in right seat, 32-year-old Pierre-Cédric Bonin (PF-Pilot Flying) had joined Air France in October 2003 and had 2,936 flight hours, of which 807 hours were on the Airbus A330

That sounds like an experienced crew and if there was any inadequacy it would have been overcome in no less than 2,936 flight hours and 807 hours on the A330. I've flown both the F-16 and C-40 with pilots that had less than 807 hours and just came from training and none of them had any issues. The issue with AF447 was the pitot tube iced and showed incorrect information and both the PF & PM attempted to fix the issue but made it worse. If you think I'm wrong look at how the NWA crew handled Flight 8 which had the same pitot freezing issue.

• In response to the stall, first officer Robert took over control and pushed his control stick forward to lower the nose and recover from the stall; however, Bonin was still pulling his control stick back, lifting the nose further up. The inputs cancelled each other out.
• The pilot-in-control pulled back on the stick, thus increasing the angle of attack and causing the aircraft to climb rapidly.
• In April 2012 in The Daily Telegraph, British journalist Nick Ross published a comparison of Airbus and Boeing flight controls; unlike the control yoke used on Boeing flight decks, the Airbus side stick controls give little visual feedback and no sensory or tactile feedback to the second pilot. Ross reasoned that this might in part explain why the pilot flying's fatal nose-up inputs were not countermanded by his two colleagues

Is AF447 the incident you're referring to? Having both side sticks synced would make it easier to see what was happening. I wish auto throttle moved the thrust levers on the A320 like the 737. I hear the A220 does move as well.

It is a big issue but I would doubt Airbus would have offered it given the different flight philosophies of Boeing and Airbus. I have thousands of hours in a 737 and A320 and the 737 is made to be flown and the A320 is made to be flown in auto pilot. I know Captains who engage autopilot at V1 and don't disengage it until minimums which is how the A320 was made to be flown.

I can't sit in regular economy because I am tall and my knees hit the back of the seat in front of me.

Focusing on customer satisfaction and not profit would be better.

I am was referring to an incident, not an accident involving opposite control inputs which very well may have been evident in the Air France crash due to pitot tubes freezing over.

Apologies if I have already mentioned. For anyone not familiar, the pitot static system on aircraft allows the instrument system and/or computers to determine speed. Static pressure vs pitot pressure. When part of this system freezes over, the airspeed indication may rise and may indicate an over speed condition. Normally the pitot heat system prevents this. Air France had a brand of pitot tubes/heat that did not always work effectively. I think subsequently, they have all been changed out.

If the pilot does not question this acceleration indication, they may reduce the power in an attempt to control their speed (indication) but actually they are slowing down and eventually will stall. The key is understanding that the aircraft especially during steady state cruise should not just mysteriously accelerate.

 

[cube]

Do you work for Airbus?
You're right but as a pilot I also jump seat in the cabin of various aircraft. I have close to 600,000 miles logged as a passenger across various airlines and aircraft so I am an expert in PasEx given those credentials. What are your credentials in PasEx? How about the A321XLR putting a flight attendant seat on the lav door to add more passenger seats?
I will say the flight deck is more spacious on the A320 than the 737 but it is also a newer design by 20 years. It's also quieter than the 737 but some good ANR headsets lie my Bose A20 make them the same. Boeing kept the 737 the way it has overtime to keep the same type rating.

Ryanair doesn't have a 737 MAX yet which is proof that it is the airlines which dictate the layout of their cabin. Ryanair like easyJet is a low cost carrier and their objective is to get as many seats onboard to increase revenue. Southwest has the same configuration on the 737 MAX 8 they have on the 737-800 and according to a WN. The lav on WN's 737 MAX 8 is the same size as their 737-800. I checked to see if my guy was right.

Having 1 fatality with 60 passengers on an aircraft disaster is pretty great. No deaths would be even better but that can hardly be attributed to the A320's FBW.

It shows the PF was only paying attention to the instruments but when the PM attempted to intervene it was too late because of FBW. This wouldn't have happened on a Boeing because the PM would have been no computer to override the inputs. I've done a similar maneuver in the 737 sim and was successful.

It does have to do with the difference in flight philosophies between Boeing and Airbus. Boeing is made to be flown and Airbus is made to be flown on autopilot. Active sidesticks have no use with an aircraft that is made to be flown on auto pilot. I fly with Captains who engage autopilot at V1 and don't disengage it until minimums which is how the A320 was made to be flown.

It means you personally don't care about more comfort, but many people do. Pure passengers would tend to be less biased.

See the post that had been edited regarding Ryanair and Southwest. There was some misinformation going around concerning the latter. The press about Ryanair is certainly based on the announced configuration and AA experience. Personally, I would not complain about an LCCs does unless I have no choice. Fortunately, easyJet flies Airbus.

The point about Garuda is that maybe nobody would have died on an A320 and that would be why Sully could not flare.

The point about AF447 is that:

- If the piloting officer had kept the plane flying as it was (as specified) it would not have started stalling
- Responding to a stall warning at altitude by pulling up is unacceptable. Intuition should tell you that.
- The original pitot fault would be recoverable. It should not have been necessary to recover from bad piloting.

So now you say it does not matter that the Airbus joysticks have no force feedback.

 

[VivaLasVegas]

I am was referring to an incident, not an accident involving opposite control inputs which very well may have been evident in the Air France crash due to pitot tubes freezing over.

Understood. There were two similar incidents to AF447

• TAM Flight 8091, from Miami to Rio de Janeiro on 21 May 2009, involving an A330-200, showed a sudden drop of outside air temperature, then loss of air data, the ADIRS, autopilot and autothrust. The aircraft descended 1,000 metres (3,300 ft) before being manually recovered using backup instruments.
• Northwest Airlines flight from Hong Kong to Tokyo,

The NTSB concluding in both cases that the aircraft operating manual was sufficient to prevent a dangerous situation from occurring.

Apologies if I have already mentioned. For anyone not familiar, the pitot static system on aircraft allows the instrument system and/or computers to determine speed. Static pressure vs pitot pressure. When part of this system freezes over, the airspeed indication may rise and may indicate an over speed condition. Normally the pitot heat system prevents this. Air France had a brand of pitot tubes/heat that did not always work effectively. I think subsequently, they have all been changed out.

If the pilot does not question this acceleration indication, they may reduce the power in an attempt to control their speed (indication) but actually they are slowing down and eventually will stall. The key is understanding that the aircraft especially during steady state cruise should not just mysteriously accelerate.

I agree if my instruments start showing something that doesn't look right in straight and level flight I question them. So far I have only had one issue and it was with the attitude indicator on an A319 at VX. I was the PM during that flight so it wasn't as big of an issue as it could have been. At recurrent training they have instrument failures and it's challenging but any pilot with 807 hours in that type should be able to handle it.

It means you personally don't care about more comfort, but many people do. Pure passengers would tend to be less biased.

I care about comfort but to blame Boeing for what the airlines order is unfair. I've flown both the 737 and A320 type as a pilot and passenger. As a passenger I have flown on various airlines and I have seen how different airlines outfit their aircraft to know it is the airline driving this.

See the post that had been edited regarding Ryanair and Southwest. There was some misinformation going around concerning the latter. The press about Ryanair is certainly based on the announced configuration and AA experience. Personally, I would not complain about an LCCs does unless I have no choice. Fortunately, easyJet flies Airbus.

I missed the edit so I apologize. I haven't been on an AA 737 MAX yet but I hope to because I want to see how bad the lav and less pitch really is. I am tall so I can't sit in regular economy without my knees being on the seat in front of me. I complain about LCCs because that is what's driving this. Passengers want cheap and airlines have to be able to afford to fly an aircraft on a route. So cheap tickets means less seat pitch and width. It's simple economics.
Every year my wife and I go to Hawaii and we usually fly DEN-HNL on a UA 777 because my brother flies for UA and is able to get us discounted tickets. Up until 2 years ago there were 9 seats across the back which was not terrible. Last year there were 10 across and it was uncomfortable and I physically ached. After doing research I learned the airlines did it to lower seat cost to attract new customers.
The other reason I complain about LCCs is because they aid in keeping my pay down. As long as people fly on LCCs there will be pilots there and as long as there are pilots at LCCs the rest of the airlines won't have to pay their pilots more. Again it's simple economics.

The point about Garuda is that maybe nobody would have died on an A320 and that would be why Sully could not flare.

Sullenberger couldn't flair because the computer overrode his input. If he could flair he would have decreased his rate of decent which would mean he would have impacted the Hudson at a slower speed. If this were to happen when landing on a runway it could have been worse. I've had to do high speed landings on a sim during recurrent where I couldn't flair so again I know what I'm talking about.

The point about AF447 is that:

- If the piloting officer had kept the plane flying as it was (as specified) it would not have started stalling
- Responding to a stall warning at altitude by pulling up is unacceptable.
- The original pitot fault would be recoverable. It should not have been necessary to recover from bad piloting.

The PF should have questioned the sudden change in
Anyone who has ever piloted any aircraft knows not to pull up in a stall. Pulling up in a stall only exacerbates the stall. What I was taught when I was working on my PPL in college was to push down which will help gain speed to overcome the stall. The cause of AF447 was pilot error despite what AF says. Sure the frozen pitot tube shares the blame but it is not the cause of the incident that is pilot error.

So now you say it does not matter that the Airbus joysticks have no force feedback.

You must have misunderstood my post. The active sidestick does matter but I don't see Airbus introducing one because of their philosophy. Airbus relies on the computers and gives the computer more control and Boeing relies on the pilot. With autopilot and auto thrust engaged on a Boeing I can see what is happening by looking at the yoke and thrust levers. On an Airbus with autopilot and auto thrust engaged I can't see anything because the sidestick is stationary and the thrust levers are wherever they were prior to auto thrust being engaged. But on an Airbus I have a tray table and that makes eating easier.
Just to be clear I don't dislike either but I would like an active sidestick and thrust levers on the A320 because I like seeing what the auto pilot and auto thrust are doing. This isn't a 737 versus A320 thing but an issue with seeing what the computer is doing versus not seeing what the computer is doing. I think the flight deck on an A320 is better than the 737 but I understand why Boeing has kept the 737 the way it has. I am sure some operators of both types order newer models because the type ratings are the same.

 

[cube]

Understood. There were two similar incidents to AF447

• TAM Flight 8091, from Miami to Rio de Janeiro on 21 May 2009, involving an A330-200, showed a sudden drop of outside air temperature, then loss of air data, the ADIRS, autopilot and autothrust. The aircraft descended 1,000 metres (3,300 ft) before being manually recovered using backup instruments.
• Northwest Airlines flight from Hong Kong to Tokyo,

The NTSB concluding in both cases that the aircraft operating manual was sufficient to prevent a dangerous situation from occurring.

I agree if my instruments start showing something that doesn't look right in straight and level flight I question them. So far I have only had one issue and it was with the attitude indicator on an A319 at VX. I was the PM during that flight so it wasn't as big of an issue as it could have been. At recurrent training they have instrument failures and it's challenging but any pilot with 807 hours in that type should be able to handle it.

I care about comfort but to blame Boeing for what the airlines order is unfair. I've flown both the 737 and A320 type as a pilot and passenger. As a passenger I have flown on various airlines and I have seen how different airlines outfit their aircraft to know it is the airline driving this.

I missed the edit so I apologize. I haven't been on an AA 737 MAX yet but I hope to because I want to see how bad the lav and less pitch really is. I am tall so I can't sit in regular economy without my knees being on the seat in front of me. I complain about LCCs because that is what's driving this. Passengers want cheap and airlines have to be able to afford to fly an aircraft on a route. So cheap tickets means less seat pitch and width. It's simple economics.
Every year my wife and I go to Hawaii and we usually fly DEN-HNL on a UA 777 because my brother flies for UA and is able to get us discounted tickets. Up until 2 years ago there were 9 seats across the back which was not terrible. Last year there were 10 across and it was uncomfortable and I physically ached. After doing research I learned the airlines did it to lower seat cost to attract new customers.
The other reason I complain about LCCs is because they aid in keeping my pay down. As long as people fly on LCCs there will be pilots there and as long as there are pilots at LCCs the rest of the airlines won't have to pay their pilots more. Again it's simple economics.

Sullenberger couldn't flair because the computer overrode his input. If he could flair he would have decreased his rate of decent which would mean he would have impacted the Hudson at a slower speed. If this were to happen when landing on a runway it could have been worse. I've had to do high speed landings on a sim during recurrent where I couldn't flair so again I know what I'm talking about.

The PF should have questioned the sudden change in
Anyone who has ever piloted any aircraft knows not to pull up in a stall. Pulling up in a stall only exacerbates the stall. What I was taught when I was working on my PPL in college was to push down which will help gain speed to overcome the stall. The cause of AF447 was pilot error despite what AF says. Sure the frozen pitot tube shares the blame but it is not the cause of the incident that is pilot error.

You must have misunderstood my post. The active sidestick does matter but I don't see Airbus introducing one because of their philosophy. Airbus relies on the computers and gives the computer more control and Boeing relies on the pilot. With autopilot and auto thrust engaged on a Boeing I can see what is happening by looking at the yoke and thrust levers. On an Airbus with autopilot and auto thrust engaged I can't see anything because the sidestick is stationary and the thrust levers are wherever they were prior to auto thrust being engaged. But on an Airbus I have a tray table and that makes eating easier.
Just to be clear I don't dislike either but I would like an active sidestick and thrust levers on the A320 because I like seeing what the auto pilot and auto thrust are doing. This isn't a 737 versus A320 thing but an issue with seeing what the computer is doing versus not seeing what the computer is doing. I think the flight deck on an A320 is better than the 737 but I understand why Boeing has kept the 737 the way it has. I am sure some operators of both types order newer models because the type ratings are the same.

I don't blame Boeing for the 737. It is much older than the A320 and still very successful. Of course it is the airlines' fault if they don't choose the better stuff (or actually, the passengers').

Well, the Garuda plane apparently broke because it hit the bottom of the river tail first.

I think I would like Airbus to bring a feedback joystick. I tried one in the early 90's (quite unwieldy beast then).
Maybe they don't like the breakage risk.

 

[cube]

I see that in the specific Garuda case, computers would have been irrelevant because the battery failed (inadequate maintenance) and they could not start the APU either.

But the A320 has a RAT, while the 737 does not. If this did not fail too, the essential electrical systems would work.

 

[quagmire]

I hate Airbus vs Boeing debates. There are accidents that could have been prevented if it was in a Boeing and others that could have been prevented if it was in an Airbus. Both are safe aircraft but with two different philosophies. Miracle of the Hudson has ZERO to due with FBW or Airbus's way of flying. That was 100% pure crew working effectively together and got that bird down safely.

As for AF447..... A lot went wrong in that accident. First you need to understand how Airbus programmed their planes. With the frozen pitot tubes, it caused the plane to think it was overspeeding. In response, the plane is programmed to pitch up in an effort to slow down. When the autopilot kicked off, the pilot in the right seat was still thinking it was an overspeed situation hence the pull back of the stick. At the same time they were both dealing with information overload due to the countless cautions and warnings they were getting. Unfortunately this caused the pilot in the right seat to focus on those cautions and warnings while not realizing he was still pulling the stick back due to the distraction. It wasn't until 10,000 feet or so did he realize was still holding the stick aft. At that point it was too late to recover due to how deep of a stall they were in. It wasn't necessarily the pilot inappropriately reacting to a stall, it was a pilot reacting to the first event of the plane telling them they were overspeeding the plane which was a false indication and then the distraction of the system failures they were getting. Yes it is still pilot error, but to go and say they pilots were incompetent/inexperienced is false. And yes maybe if that was a Boeing, it could have been saved due to the yokes being synced and the pilot in the left seat would have known the pilot in the right seat was pulling back.

If you want an accident that displays a pilots improper response to a stall, that's the Buffalo crash. The result of that accident has brought out some good and bad results due to the changes, but that is another subject......

And as for my preference, I prefer Boeing's philosophy. The automation should be there to help the pilot, but should not override the pilot. The pilot should have the final say in how the plane is flown. But I would be fine with flying either. It's whatever plane that gets me the best QoL, pay, schedule, etc.

@VivaLasVegas As for NK, living in base is great. I currently live in base and it is just awesome at an end of a trip, I just hop in my car and drive home. Even if we were delayed that day and got in past the last flights out, don't have to worry about missing my commute home. I was extended into my day off last week to where I just had to operate the first morning flight to my base and I was home at 9 am. So I still had the whole day off essentially, got 150% extension pay, and since I am on reserve I get that day off back. I would have a line at our other base, but the living in base part is still such a huge benefit for now. Plus company has to get me back home so even if I was released at our other base, they have to give me a positive space ticket back home.

But hope you're aware of how their training program is.

 

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https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2009/06/us-airways-200906

The latest AF447 report largely blames the pilots (captain's lack of rest, not avoiding storm, improper response to failure, improper response to stall, cockpit management failure, lack of high altitude training).

Direct cause: "loss of control due to improper actions while flying in manual mode".

I know the Buffalo crash, part of this is similar.

 

[quagmire]

https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2009/06/us-airways-200906

The latest AF447 report largely blames the pilots (captain's lack of rest, not avoiding storm, improper response to failure, improper response to stall, cockpit management failure, lack of high altitude training).

Direct cause: "loss of control due to improper actions while flying in manual mode".

I know the Buffalo crash, part of this is similar.

If you want to believe a fluff piece which the author only has surface knowledge of the A320 found on an Airbus press release over a pilot who has deep knowledge of the systems, fine by me. It was already stated that the Airbus's systems actually interfered and made the impact to the water harder than it could have been if Sully had full control over the plane. That article did nothing to prove the A320 or FBW played any role in USAir 1549.

Where did I say AF447 was not pilot error? I was only giving insight in what lead to those errors. There is only so much information a person can take in, process, and take action on. They got overwhelmed with information and unfortunately all that information made the pilot in the right seat forget he was pulling the stick back still without realizing it until it was too late due to information overload. The cause of the accident is still pilot error. But having a better perspective into the events that lead to the accident is better than just throwing out that crew was incompetent and inexperienced.

 

[cube]

I said FBW might have been a success factor for the AA plane. In any case it is certain that that the crew actions were the deciding factor. The flare criticism is to be taken into account, but it does not prove the computer was not properly programmed for the general case.

There's a documentary in French. Pilots interviewed cannot understand how the AF junior officer could fail in such a basic way. It also shows the pilots at the controls did not get training for such a scenario (frozen pitots seemed to be quite common).

About the captain, the latest report complains that he was not at the controls during the critical region crossing (it seems that there were no official declarations regarding fatigue). According to AF he could rest whenever he wanted.

 

[VivaLasVegas]

I don't blame Boeing for the 737. It is much older than the A320 and still very successful. Of course it is the airlines' fault if they don't choose the better stuff (or actually, the passengers').

I would say it's the passengers' fault because they want low airfare and the airlines have to add more passengers to make the flight profitable. All it takes is a basic understanding of how economics works.
I fly both and I like both but from a pilot's perspective I prefer the 737 because of the active yoke and thrust levers. If the A320 had an active sidestick and active thrust levers for auto throttle I might change my mind.
After more research it seems the internal difference between the 737 and A320 is 0.16 m and 0.34 m is the outside difference. That's like 6 in which is even more negligible.
A little history on the fuselage plug of the 737 is needed to understand why the 737 has the fuselage plug it does. The fuselage plug was actually not designed for the 737 but it was designed for the 707 and used in the 707, 720, 727, 737 & 757. The only Boeing 367-80 produced has the original fuselage prior to being widened for the 707. It was originally 132 in wide and made for 4 across. By the time the 707 came into production it was 148 in wide and 6 across because that's what the airlines wanted. The 16 in difference is big until you realize there are 2 extra seats. Ironically I think it was AA behind this from what I remember.
In a previous post I said "Boeing kept the 737 the way it has overtime to keep the same type rating" which is true. I had a professor in college tell us Boeing wanted to put the 757's nose on the 737 but didn't because it would require a different type rating. If Boeing changed the 737 like some pilots want it would require a different type rating and customers who have a lot of 737 like AA, FR, UA & WN might look at other manufactures. Keeping the same type rating saves money on training.

Well, the Garuda plane apparently broke because it hit the bottom of the river tail first.

I think I would like Airbus to bring a feedback joystick. I tried one in the early 90's (quite unwieldy beast then).
Maybe they don't like the breakage risk.

I had a feedback joystick in the 90's as a kid for a flight simulator and thought it was cool because I could feel the feedback from the wind and everything. What breakage risk is there in an active sidestick? The Gulfstream G500 and G600 and the Irkut MC-21 have them and so far there have been no issues in testing.

see that in the specific Garuda case, computers would have been irrelevant because the battery failed (inadequate maintenance) and they could not start the APU either.

But the A320 has a RAT, while the 737 does not. If this did not fail too, the essential electrical systems would work.

In a 737 there is no need for the RAT because it is still mechanical in a lot of aspects.

I hate Airbus vs Boeing debates. There are accidents that could have been prevented if it was in a Boeing and others that could have been prevented if it was in an Airbus. Both are safe aircraft but with two different philosophies. Miracle of the Hudson has ZERO to due with FBW or Airbus's way of flying. That was 100% pure crew working effectively together and got that bird down safely.

I've flown both a 737 and the A320 family and I like them both. Most of the debates which have to do with the cabin are at the fault of the airline that orders the aircraft and not the manufacture. I agree there are 2 different philosophies and I understand both. You're right Miracle of the Hudson was a CRM success not an FBW or Airbus success. The biggest factor was Sullenberger started the APU earlier than the QRH called for.

As for AF447..... A lot went wrong in that accident. First you need to understand how Airbus programmed their planes. With the frozen pitot tubes, it caused the plane to think it was overspeeding. In response, the plane is programmed to pitch up in an effort to slow down. When the autopilot kicked off, the pilot in the right seat was still thinking it was an overspeed situation hence the pull back of the stick. At the same time they were both dealing with information overload due to the countless cautions and warnings they were getting. Unfortunately this caused the pilot in the right seat to focus on those cautions and warnings while not realizing he was still pulling the stick back due to the distraction. It wasn't until 10,000 feet or so did he realize was still holding the stick aft. At that point it was too late to recover due to how deep of a stall they were in. It wasn't necessarily the pilot inappropriately reacting to a stall, it was a pilot reacting to the first event of the plane telling them they were overspeeding the plane which was a false indication and then the distraction of the system failures they were getting. Yes it is still pilot error, but to go and say they pilots were incompetent/inexperienced is false. And yes maybe if that was a Boeing, it could have been saved due to the yokes being synced and the pilot in the left seat would have known the pilot in the right seat was pulling back.

A lot did go wrong in AF447! I wouldn't call the pilots incompetent or inexperienced. When the PF had 2,936 flight hours, of which 807 hours were on the Airbus A330 that is not an incompetent/inexperience issue. I flew the F-16 and C-40 with pilots who had less than 807 hours and we had no issues. Even scarier I flew the T-38 instructing students who had only flew the T-6 previously for no more than 100 hours.

If you want an accident that displays a pilots improper response to a stall, that's the Buffalo crash. The result of that accident has brought out some good and bad results due to the changes, but that is another subject......

The Buffalo crash was an improper response to a stall. Like AF447 the Colgan 3407 pulled back in a stall. If you start a thread on the good and bad results let me know because I am interested in seeing your thoughts and sharing mine.

And as for my preference, I prefer Boeing's philosophy. The automation should be there to help the pilot, but should not override the pilot. The pilot should have the final say in how the plane is flown. But I would be fine with flying either. It's whatever plane that gets me the best QoL, pay, schedule, etc.

I too prefer Boeing's philosophy because I feel in control. Like you I feel automation should be there to help and not override the pilot. I have flown the C-40, A319, A320 & A321 and they're all safe.

@VivaLasVegas As for NK, living in base is great. I currently live in base and it is just awesome at an end of a trip, I just hop in my car and drive home. Even if we were delayed that day and got in past the last flights out, don't have to worry about missing my commute home. I was extended into my day off last week to where I just had to operate the first morning flight to my base and I was home at 9 am. So I still had the whole day off essentially, got 150% extension pay, and since I am on reserve I get that day off back. I would have a line at our other base, but the living in base part is still such a huge benefit for now. Plus company has to get me back home so even if I was released at our other base, they have to give me a positive space ticket back home.

Are you with NK now? If so PM me because I have a lot of questions and don't want to hijack this thread. I haven't lived in base since I was in the Air Force but NK could keep me from commuting LAS-JFK. I am at B6 now but I leave later to go to SDF for an interview with UPS. @Huntn told me what I have heard from others that the cargo pilot life is hard so I am rethinking it. I put an application with AA and UA in Saturday night and have had one with NK for a few weeks now. I got a reply back from UA to take their assessment but I am had 2 internal recommendations.
@cube on my LAS-SDF flight I leave on an A321 and return on a 737-800 so I will pay attention to the two aircraft since I am paying for that flight.
@Scepticalscribe My sister is letting me use her Rimowa for the trip. My initial impression is that it fits what I need and it feels durable.

But hope you're aware of how their training program is.

I don't know much about NK so please tell me how their training program is.

https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2009/06/us-airways-200906

The latest AF447 report largely blames the pilots (captain's lack of rest, not avoiding storm, improper response to failure, improper response to stall, cockpit management failure, lack of high altitude training).

Direct cause: "loss of control due to improper actions while flying in manual mode".

I know the Buffalo crash, part of this is similar.

Not avoiding the storm might not have been the pilots' fault. I have had to fly through storms due to fuel or the size of the storm before and a few times I was unable to get rerouted around the storm.

If you want to believe a fluff piece which the author only has surface knowledge of the A320 found on an Airbus press release over a pilot who has deep knowledge of the systems, fine by me. It was already stated that the Airbus's systems actually interfered and made the impact to the water harder than it could have been if Sully had full control over the plane. That article did nothing to prove the A320 or FBW played any role in USAir 1549.

I don't see how the A320 or FBW played a role in 1549. If anything it was CRM.

Where did I say AF447 was not pilot error? I was only giving insight in what lead to those errors. There is only so much information a person can take in, process, and take action on. They got overwhelmed with information and unfortunately all that information made the pilot in the right seat forget he was pulling the stick back still without realizing it until it was too late due to information overload. The cause of the accident is still pilot error. But having a better perspective into the events that lead to the accident is better than just throwing out that crew was incompetent and inexperienced.

I agree AF447 is pilot error.

 

[cube]

I would say it's the passengers' fault because they want low airfare and the airlines have to add more passengers to make the flight profitable. All it takes is a basic understanding of how economics works.

I had a feedback joystick in the 90's as a kid for a flight simulator and thought it was cool because I could feel the feedback from the wind and everything. What breakage risk is there in an active sidestick? The Gulfstream G500 and G600 and the Irkut MC-21 have them and so far there have been no issues in testing.

In a 737 there is no need for the RAT because it is still mechanical in a lot of aspects.

I don't see how the A320 or FBW played a role in 1549. If anything it was CRM.

As I said, it would be the passengers at the root.

I used a powerful research joystick. What might break is the actuation blocking it in a certain position, it would have to be designed so that this can't happen (losing just some degree of feedback).

Yes, the 737 does not need a RAT for the hydraulics, but you lose the electricals without both battery, APU, and engines.

Sully was flying a bit too slow, so alpha protection engaged.

 

[lowendlinux]

I came for the pictures not arguments about big ugly flying buses.

 

[Scepticalscribe]

I came for the pictures not arguments about big ugly flying buses.

Actually, I'm interested in both, - or, rather, I am interested in reading what informed professionals have to say about both, as I am interested in the history and works of aviation, but my only practical experience has been as a passenger.

 

[Glideslope]

Actually, I'm interested in both, - or, rather, I am interested in reading what informed professionals have to say about both, as I am interested in the history and works of aviation, but my only practical experience has been as a passenger.

While this is a neat thread with some pilots, I'd recommend the forums at airliners.net or, the best IMO, PPRuNE.org. The days of heated battles over side sticks vs yolks have diminished significantly over the years. A great deal of preference has to do with ones background. Personally, I loved the side stick setup on my Lawn Dart, as well as center sticks, and yolks that I've flown. "Stick and Rudder" flying in a Super Cub, or a C-170 type was always the most enjoyable for me.

 

[Huntn]

I came for the pictures not arguments about big ugly flying buses.

Most are beautiful.

 

[cube]

Insects in pitots causing some trouble again. Actually, failing to remove the covers this time.

 

[lowendlinux]

Most are beautiful.

In a voluptuous sort of way

 

[Glideslope]

I came for the pictures not arguments about big ugly flying buses.

10th Mountain Division?

 

[lowendlinux]

10th Mountain Division?

I was 4/31 Infantry, now a DoD civilian stationed up here again.

 

[Glideslope]

I was 4/31 Infantry, now a DoD civilian stationed up here again.

Thanks for your service. I was an Army Brat way back. My Father was with the Corps SAD in the 60's. Civil Engineer.

I don't live too far from you up there. Around 3 hrs SE in the woods on a small pond.

 

[cube]

Some sensationalist press. Air Belgium's A340s are at most 11 years old and they come straight from Finnair.

Comparable BA average ages:
747: 21.9
777: 16.1
767: 21.4

No problem with a wet lease there.

Finnair has just sold 60% of Norra with both subfleets at the 10 year mark.