I don't blame Boeing for the 737. It is much older than the A320 and still very successful. Of course it is the airlines' fault if they don't choose the better stuff (or actually, the passengers').
I would say it's the passengers' fault because they want low airfare and the airlines have to add more passengers to make the flight profitable. All it takes is a basic understanding of how economics works.
I fly both and I like both but from a pilot's perspective I prefer the 737 because of the active yoke and thrust levers. If the A320 had an active sidestick and active thrust levers for auto throttle I might change my mind.
After more research it seems the internal difference between the 737 and A320 is 0.16 m and 0.34 m is the outside difference. That's like 6 in which is even more negligible.
A little history on the fuselage plug of the 737 is needed to understand why the 737 has the fuselage plug it does. The fuselage plug was actually not designed for the 737 but it was designed for the 707 and used in the 707, 720, 727, 737 & 757. The only Boeing 367-80 produced has the original fuselage prior to being widened for the 707. It was originally 132 in wide and made for 4 across. By the time the 707 came into production it was 148 in wide and 6 across because that's what the airlines wanted. The 16 in difference is big until you realize there are 2 extra seats. Ironically I think it was AA behind this from what I remember.
In a previous post I said "Boeing kept the 737 the way it has overtime to keep the same type rating" which is true. I had a professor in college tell us Boeing wanted to put the 757's nose on the 737 but didn't because it would require a different type rating. If Boeing changed the 737 like some pilots want it would require a different type rating and customers who have a lot of 737 like AA, FR, UA & WN might look at other manufactures. Keeping the same type rating saves money on training.
Well, the Garuda plane apparently broke because it hit the bottom of the river tail first.
I think I would like Airbus to bring a feedback joystick. I tried one in the early 90's (quite unwieldy beast then).
Maybe they don't like the breakage risk.
I had a feedback joystick in the 90's as a kid for a flight simulator and thought it was cool because I could feel the feedback from the wind and everything. What breakage risk is there in an active sidestick? The Gulfstream G500 and G600 and the Irkut MC-21 have them and so far there have been no issues in testing.
see that in the specific Garuda case, computers would have been irrelevant because the battery failed (inadequate maintenance) and they could not start the APU either.
But the A320 has a RAT, while the 737 does not. If this did not fail too, the essential electrical systems would work.
In a 737 there is no need for the RAT because it is still mechanical in a lot of aspects.
I hate Airbus vs Boeing debates. There are accidents that could have been prevented if it was in a Boeing and others that could have been prevented if it was in an Airbus. Both are safe aircraft but with two different philosophies. Miracle of the Hudson has ZERO to due with FBW or Airbus's way of flying. That was 100% pure crew working effectively together and got that bird down safely.
I've flown both a 737 and the A320 family and I like them both. Most of the debates which have to do with the cabin are at the fault of the airline that orders the aircraft and not the manufacture. I agree there are 2 different philosophies and I understand both. You're right Miracle of the Hudson was a CRM success not an FBW or Airbus success. The biggest factor was Sullenberger started the APU earlier than the QRH called for.
As for AF447..... A lot went wrong in that accident. First you need to understand how Airbus programmed their planes. With the frozen pitot tubes, it caused the plane to think it was overspeeding. In response, the plane is programmed to pitch up in an effort to slow down. When the autopilot kicked off, the pilot in the right seat was still thinking it was an overspeed situation hence the pull back of the stick. At the same time they were both dealing with information overload due to the countless cautions and warnings they were getting. Unfortunately this caused the pilot in the right seat to focus on those cautions and warnings while not realizing he was still pulling the stick back due to the distraction. It wasn't until 10,000 feet or so did he realize was still holding the stick aft. At that point it was too late to recover due to how deep of a stall they were in. It wasn't necessarily the pilot inappropriately reacting to a stall, it was a pilot reacting to the first event of the plane telling them they were overspeeding the plane which was a false indication and then the distraction of the system failures they were getting. Yes it is still pilot error, but to go and say they pilots were incompetent/inexperienced is false. And yes maybe if that was a Boeing, it could have been saved due to the yokes being synced and the pilot in the left seat would have known the pilot in the right seat was pulling back.
A lot did go wrong in AF447! I wouldn't call the pilots incompetent or inexperienced. When the PF had 2,936 flight hours, of which 807 hours were on the Airbus A330 that is not an incompetent/inexperience issue. I flew the F-16 and C-40 with pilots who had less than 807 hours and we had no issues. Even scarier I flew the T-38 instructing students who had only flew the T-6 previously for no more than 100 hours.
If you want an accident that displays a pilots improper response to a stall, that's the Buffalo crash. The result of that accident has brought out some good and bad results due to the changes, but that is another subject......
The Buffalo crash was an improper response to a stall. Like AF447 the Colgan 3407 pulled back in a stall. If you start a thread on the good and bad results let me know because I am interested in seeing your thoughts and sharing mine.
And as for my preference, I prefer Boeing's philosophy. The automation should be there to help the pilot, but should not override the pilot. The pilot should have the final say in how the plane is flown. But I would be fine with flying either. It's whatever plane that gets me the best QoL, pay, schedule, etc.
I too prefer Boeing's philosophy because I feel in control. Like you I feel automation should be there to help and not override the pilot. I have flown the C-40, A319, A320 & A321 and they're all safe.
@VivaLasVegas As for NK, living in base is great. I currently live in base and it is just awesome at an end of a trip, I just hop in my car and drive home. Even if we were delayed that day and got in past the last flights out, don't have to worry about missing my commute home. I was extended into my day off last week to where I just had to operate the first morning flight to my base and I was home at 9 am. So I still had the whole day off essentially, got 150% extension pay, and since I am on reserve I get that day off back.
I would have a line at our other base, but the living in base part is still such a huge benefit for now. Plus company has to get me back home so even if I was released at our other base, they have to give me a positive space ticket back home.
Are you with NK now? If so PM me because I have a lot of questions and don't want to hijack this thread. I haven't lived in base since I was in the Air Force but NK could keep me from commuting LAS-JFK. I am at B6 now but I leave later to go to SDF for an interview with UPS.
@Huntn told me what I have heard from others that the cargo pilot life is hard so I am rethinking it. I put an application with AA and UA in Saturday night and have had one with NK for a few weeks now. I got a reply back from UA to take their assessment but I am had 2 internal recommendations.
@cube on my LAS-SDF flight I leave on an A321 and return on a 737-800 so I will pay attention to the two aircraft since I am paying for that flight.
@Scepticalscribe My sister is letting me use her Rimowa for the trip. My initial impression is that it fits what I need and it feels durable.
But hope you're aware of how their training program is.
I don't know much about NK so please tell me how their training program is.
https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2009/06/us-airways-200906
The latest AF447 report largely blames the pilots (captain's lack of rest, not avoiding storm, improper response to failure, improper response to stall, cockpit management failure, lack of high altitude training).
Direct cause: "loss of control due to improper actions while flying in manual mode".
I know the Buffalo crash, part of this is similar.
Not avoiding the storm might not have been the pilots' fault. I have had to fly through storms due to fuel or the size of the storm before and a few times I was unable to get rerouted around the storm.
If you want to believe a fluff piece which the author only has surface knowledge of the A320 found on an Airbus press release over a pilot who has deep knowledge of the systems, fine by me. It was already stated that the Airbus's systems actually interfered and made the impact to the water harder than it could have been if Sully had full control over the plane. That article did nothing to prove the A320 or FBW played any role in USAir 1549.
I don't see how the A320 or FBW played a role in 1549. If anything it was CRM.
Where did I say AF447 was not pilot error? I was only giving insight in what lead to those errors. There is only so much information a person can take in, process, and take action on. They got overwhelmed with information and unfortunately all that information made the pilot in the right seat forget he was pulling the stick back still without realizing it until it was too late due to information overload. The cause of the accident is still pilot error. But having a better perspective into the events that lead to the accident is better than just throwing out that crew was incompetent and inexperienced.
I agree AF447 is pilot error.